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The early paragraphs of John Locke’s Second Treatise describe a poetic idyll of property 
acquisition widely supposed to have cast the template for imperial possessions in the New 
World. In the state of nature ‘nobody has originally a private dominion exclusive of the rest 
of mankind.’ Yet by ‘the labour of his body and the work of his hands…whatsoever then he 
removes out the state that nature has provided…he has mixed his labour with, and joined to it 
something that is his own, and thereby makes it is property.…’ 
Few theorists of sovereignty and international law have read much farther in Locke’s 
brief treatise, thus saving themselves (and their assumptions) from the surprises lurking in the 
later chapters on conquest, usurpation and tyranny. There Locke sets forth a robust defence of 
native rights to lands and possessions that survive to succeeding generations. Thus ‘the 
inhabitants of any country who are descended and derive a title to their estates from those 
who are subdued and had a government forced upon them against their free consents retain a 
right to the possession of their ancestors…. Their persons are free by a native right, and their 
properties, be they more or less, are their own and at their own disposal, and not at his.’.  
Locke himself observed that doubtless this ‘will seem a strange doctrine, it being quite 
contrary to the practice of the world.’ His doctrine of native right is equally strange to the 
practice of contemporary scholars who see in Lockean theory the ideological prototype of 
imperial colonialism in the ‘vacant lands’ of North America. This paper views Locke’s 
complex thinking against the background of England’s early sixteenth-century experience of 
Amerindian agriculture, territorial jurisdiction, widely acknowledged native property rights 




John Locke’s Second Treatise of Government (1690) has been widely condemned by 
contemporary scholars for devising a seductive new rationale to promote English colonial 
expansion in the New World.  Yet the ‘planting’ of English colonies had been growing apace 
for well over a century before the work appeared.  The ‘imagined’ New World was already a 
dynamic reality in imperial policy, commercial practice and English law. ‘Justifications’ for 
colonial possession appealing to theology, sovereignty and natural law were fully deployed, 
needing no assistance from Locke.  Yet the New World as a poetic genealogy of England’s 
ancient origins provided Locke with a metaphorical origin of natural private rights and free 
consent. This strengthened his domestic advocacy of parliamentary constitutionalism. But 
Locke must have known, as did the colonists, that a state of nature in the New World endured 
only in a mythic form. If appropriation in the state of nature meant anything, the American 
Indians already faced the dilemma of dispossession: dealing in the sharing and sale of land; 
or facing usurpation and tyranny worse than that experienced by their new colonial 
neighbours who fled England’s oppression. 
After a brief exegesis of Locke’s account of property and native right, this paper reviews 
the actual colonial experience of property and possession, together with its modes of 
representation and justification.  The chronology itself, and informed speculation about 
Locke’s own awareness of Indian and colonial property dealing, suggest that recent ‘post-
colonial’ critique of Locke is anachronistic, not only mistaking Locke’s rhetorical intentions 
but obscuring his arguments for native right.  It remains speculative, but plausible, that Locke 
himself acknowledged and implicitly condemned the emerging dispossession of the 
Amerindians in his robust defence of native right.  Modern and postmodern scholarship has, 
nevertheless, seized upon a peculiar misnomer, vacuum domicilium, retrofitting it to Locke’s 
theory to suggest a brutally legalistic rationale for England’s theft of a continent from its 
native owners. 
Property and possession 
Origins in nature. The early paragraphs of Locke’s Second Treatise are a rhapsody on 
human life in a state of nature; why in mutual agreement we departed its inconveniences; and 
how in the civil state we still possess, by the full right of nature, differing proportions and 
kinds of private property: some in lands and possessions, some in the labour of their bodies 
only. Modern political theorists interpret Locke’s poetic idyll of property acquisition as a 
clever, perhaps cynical, template for imperial possessions in the New World.  The same 
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theorists tend to gloss over, or ignore, a significant difference between a theory of the origins 
of private property and a theory of political sovereignty. 
In the state of nature, Locke (1988) assures his reader, ‘nobody has originally a private 
dominion exclusive of the rest of mankind.’ Yet by ‘the labour of his body and the work of 
his hands…whatsoever then he removes out the state that nature has provided…he has mixed 
his labour with, and joined to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it is 
property.… [Picking up acorns and gathering apples] added something to them more than 
nature, the common mother of all, had done; and so they became his private right’ [¶¶ 26-28]. 
¶ 28. He that is nourished by the acorns he picked up under an oak, or the apples he gathered from the 
trees in the wood, has certainly appropriated them to himself…. That labour put a distinction between 
them and common: that added something to them more than nature, the common mother of all, had 
done; and so they became his private right. 
Anyone familiar with modern Lockean scholarship and the relatively new domain of 
post-colonial and international relations theory will be familiar with Locke’s discussion of 
the move from ‘all things in common’ to private property, even if they have not carefully 
read Locke’s Second Treatise.  Its seductive portrait appeals easily to the imagination: its 
vivid pastoral and agrarian imagery of heaths and forests, wild fruits and game, the vast 
landscapes of an unspoiled new world, and amiable village trade, childlike fancy for the 
glitter of shiny metal and stones. 
Caution and heightened curiosity are required when a sophisticated philosopher writes 
about plums, apples, deer, sparkling pebbles, babbling brooks and richly ploughed fields (¶¶ 
30, 46).  These engaging metaphors introduce very different, much less pastoral and rustic, 
things. Many contemporary theorists have used insufficient caution, perhaps also insufficient 
imagination, in the face of Locke’s colourful tableau of the origins of property. Thus Locke’s 
property theory and the related labour theory of value have elicited scathing criticism for 
what is supposed to be Locke’s influential justification for dispossessing indigenous peoples 
first in the Americas and eventually in the farther reaches of British imperialism and 
capitalism generally. If labour increases the value of all things, especially land, then it would 
follow that valuable commodities like tobacco and sugar must require the labour of many 
more bodies than England’s few good honest yeoman farmers who after all cannot 
realistically be spared at home. 
Native right vs. conquest and usurpation. Few theorists of sovereignty and international law 
have read much farther that Chapter V in Locke’s brief treatise, thus saving themselves (and 
their assumptions) from the surprises lurking in later chapters on conquest, usurpation and 
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tyranny. There Locke presents a robust defence of native rights to lands and possessions, 
rights that survive to succeeding generations. Thus even in a just conquest 
the inhabitants of any country who are descended and derive a title to their estates from those who are 
subdued and had a government forced upon them against their free consents retain a right to the 
possession of their ancestors…for the first conqueror never having had a title to the land of that 
country, the people who are the descendants of, or claim under, those who were forced to submit to 
the yoke of a government by constraint have always a right to shake it off and free themselves from 
the usurpation or tyranny which the sword has brought in upon them…’ [§192]. ‘Their persons are 
free by a native right, and their properties, be they more or less, are their own and at their own 
disposal, and not at his’ [§194].  
 
Locke doesn’t mince words in opposing one ancient rationale of gaining new territory: 
‘If it be objected, This would cause endless trouble; I answer, no more than justice does, 
where she lies open to all that appeal to her.’ (¶ 176) Locke is aware that he is treading on 
revolutionary grounds.  
No damage therefore, that men in the state of nature (as all princes and governments are in reference 
to one another) suffer from one another, can give a conqueror power to dispossess the posterity of the 
vanquished, and turn them out of that inheritance, which ought to be the possession of them and their 
descendants to all generations….¶184 Their persons are free by a native right, and their properties, be 
they more or less, are their own and at their own disposal, and not at his. (¶194) 
 
Locke scholars mainly argue that Chapters 17 and 18 on conquest and usurpation 
resonate with the particular concerns of European and especially English political concerns 
(Tully 1995, 150). But I draw attention to the fact that Locke’s discussion comes against the 
backdrop of a more than a half-century of incipient revolt in the American colonies expressed 
precisely in the rhetoric of conquest, usurpation and tyranny.  Moreover, Locke’s definition 
of tyranny – ‘…the exercise of power beyond right…not for the good of those who are under 
it, but for his own private separate advantage’ (¶ 199) – is uncannily indistinguishable from 
the express purpose of the colonial companies, abetted by the commercial aspirations of the 
royal grants and charters which authorised and supported them.  Indeed, correspondence 
among colonial investors and participants a century earlier, and between these interests and 
the representatives of the crown dating to a full century earlier than Locke (in the chartered 
voyages of Cabot, Raleigh and Smith), reflect a callous and craven – one is tempted to say 
wanton – tone now associated with the spruiking of modern property speculators and local 
government development councils.  Emblematic of such works is Richard Hakluyt’s Preface 
to Divers Voyages, 1582, written to encourage Henry VIII with a ‘Godley rationale for riches 
and taking lands and things.’ (Hakluyt Society 1935 I, 178)  The argument urged upon the 
king isn’t subtle: ‘The ends of this voyage are these: 1. To Plant Christian religion. 2. To 
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trafficke. 3. To conquer. Or to doe all three.’ (Hakluyt 1935 II, 331) Britain clearly did not 
need Locke’s theory of appropriation to promote and legitimate New World exploitation.1 
The final chapter of the Second Treatise, Of the Dissolution of Government, is 
effectively a case for political resistance and ultimately revolution. Locke’s description of a 
lawless, anarchic community wherein ‘the people become a confused multitude, without 
order or connexion,’ certainly alludes to the forty years of English revolution and civil war.  
But intriguingly he observes that ‘a government without laws is, I suppose, a mystery in 
politics, unconceivable to human capacity, and inconsistent with human society.’ (¶ 219)   
This prognosis resonates tragically with contemporary Australian indigenous rhetoric 
and judicial reasoning, but I suggest a contemporaneous resonance. Locke could not have 
written this line – ‘society can never, by the fault of another, lose the native and original right 
it has to preserve itself’ (¶ 220) – in ignorance of the well-known, feared and generally 
respected American Indian tribes, whose population, territorial claims, farming, fisheries, 
governance and military superiority had been the subject of colonial negotiations for seventy 
years before the Second Treatise was published.  
These robust sentiments resonate down the centuries in the rhetoric of democratic 
revolution. It is therefore important to see them in the context of Locke’s theory of property 
appropriation, that is, as a function of first use and occupation with the rights flowing 
undiminished to successive generations. Similarly, these sentiments need to be tested in 
relation to what Locke wrote about the Indian ‘savages’ and the supposed uncharted ‘wastes 
of America.’  Locke indulged both the romantic imagery and the pragmatic estimates about 
the vastness and emptiness of the New World. But when he wrote the treatise there were 
more than twenty colonial settlements in the Massachusetts Bay area alone.  All of them had 
negotiated with and bought land from the Indians, titles to which were certified by colonial 
governing councils and disputes adjudicated by colonial courts.  No colonist or colonial 
government was under any illusions about lands being unused and unoccupied.  The 
questions thus arise, What did Locke actually know about the colonial experience, and how 
might this our understanding of his views on the appropriation of property and the survival of 
native right? 
                                                 
1 ‘[I]f we doe procrastinate the plantinge, (and where our men have now presently discovered and found it to be 
the best parte of America that is lefte and in truth more agreeable to our natures, and more nere unto us then 
Nova Hispania), the frenche, the Normans, the Brytons, or the duche, of some other nation will not onely 
prevente us of the mightie Baye of St. Laurence where they have gotten the starte of us already…but also will 
deprive us of that goodd lande which nowe wee have discovered.’ (Hakluyt 1935 II, 279) 
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Locke’s intellectual context 
Locke’s arguments are enriched by taking account of the historical context of two centuries 
of European contact with the native populations in the New World prior to his writing the 
Second Treatise and England’s more than twenty colonial settlements in Chesapeake and 
Massachusetts regions (named like all explored areas after the Indian nations and their 
territorial names).  Indeed, by the mid-seventeenth century, Locke was as well informed of 
these matters as anyone in England or Europe.  His personal library contained an extensive 
collection of 195 New World volumes, including accounts of voyages, explorations, travel 
diaries, atlases and geographical studies, and records of the colonies in South and North 
America, especially in Canada, Virginia and New England.  His interest was keen enough for 
Lord Shaftsbury, Locke’s friend and benefactor, to chide ‘the credulous Mr. Locke’ in 
relation to his love of these works (Harrison and Laslett 1971, 27; De Beer 1969, 36-37). 
It is hardly plausible that Locke, with his experience as a diplomat, Secretary to the 
Carolina Company, Secretary to the Council of Trade and Plantations and a leading figure in 
Whig political circles, was unaware of the planning and ‘planting’ of the English colonies 
and, especially their political, legal, theological and commercial affairs. These matters were 
widely publicised in Puritan sermons and pamphlets, dissenting theological disputations and 
the commercial and well as political concern in London with the commercial, legal and 
sometimes dire military fate of the colonial companies. Indeed the colonial experiences with 
the American Indians embraced the full range of these concerns.  So it is implausible to 
suggest that Locke was ignorant of the extensive, complex relations between the English 
settlers and the Indians (Wallace 1957, 315-19; Cronon 1983, 55-84).  Those relations had 
much to do with property in land, and securing title to property.  He would equally have 
known that negotiating for the purchase of land in the colonial settlements was a standard, 
long established practice, leading often to disputes over contracted agreements. The practice 
was described by the settlers in terms of rights, both in legal terminology and theological 
doctrine (Springer 1986). The negotiations for sale were supposed to be strictly regulated, 
according to both colonial and Indian law, and conducted under the exclusive authority of the 
colonial court or council and the relevant sachems (chiefs).  Nevertheless, private agreements 
were often negotiated by an individual colonist and a minor sachem, not infrequently leading 
to fines and nullification when the purchaser sought the council’s formal approval of title. 
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Ashcraft (1987, 162-63), while trying to argue that Locke viewed the Indians as savages 
still living in the state of nature, offers solid evidence that shows such a claim to be at least 
equivocal.  In any case it attests to Locke’s interest and familiarity with Indian culture. 
In one of the many journal notes Locke made from his reading about the Indians, he writes that ‘their 
kings are rather obliged by consent and persuasion than compulsion, the public good being the reason 
of their authority…and this seems to be the state of regal authority in its original in all that part of the 
world.’ 
 
The notes Ashcraft mentions confirm Locke’s familiarity with contemporary works, 
almost certainly those of Roger Williams (1643; 1988 II, 453-54) and Thomas Morton (1632 
I, 11-40), who published first-hand accounts of how sachems strive to rule by consensus 
(Davis 1970, 597-98; Gaustad 2005; Glover 2006).  If those works were known to Locke, he 
would also know that these colonial writers were describing precisely how treaties, contracts 
and the sales of land were agreed between Indians and colonial settlers. 
The plantations Locke, or any well-versed Englishman, would know most about would 
be the Boston, Providence and Connecticut colonies in New England (as it was already 
called). It had been well known from first English contact (indeed before, from Dutch, French 
and other expeditions) that distinct Indian tribes lived in established villages and cultivated 
corn and other crops on a large scale, just as some Indian settlements had constructed 
elaborate fishery catchments, weirs and other developments in rivers and lagoons (de Bry, 
1578; Hariot 1590), the knowledge of which remains a proud tradition of fishermen using 
similar pound traps in the present day (Kilgannon, 2007). These had long been commented 
upon in published accounts by European explorers, travellers and colonists, and were 
illustrated in European maps. All visitors to this New World were greatly impressed by the 
ubiquitous cornfields, corn storages, vegetable gardens and orchards, and the game that 
supplied the Indians with a diet also large in meat.  Colonists’ letters and diaries unfailingly 
attested to the Indians teaching them to cultivate corn, in particular.  Several settlements 
would not have survived if it were not for the Indians’ gifts of corn to eat and sow, teaching 
colonists as a matter of survival how and when to plant (Cave 1988; Masefield n.d.; Muldoon 
2001; Bradford 1908; Neuwirth 1986; Winthrop 1908). 
Consequently, when Locke wrote this passage toward the end of the Second Treatise, it 
is difficult to believe that his explicit allusion to the ancient ways of the English people can 
be shorn from a wider frame of reference.   
People are not so easily got out of their old forms, as some are apt to suggest. They are hardly to be 
prevailed with to amend the acknowledged faults in the frame they have been accustomed to. And if 
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there be any original defects, or adventitious ones introduced by time, or corruption; it is not an easy 
thing to get them changed, even when all the world sees there is an opportunity for it. (¶223) 
 
Indeed, this passage could easily be a description of the colonists’ dealings with the 
Indians (or vice versa). 
The ‘principle’ of vacuum domicilium 
A surprise in researching the colonial context of Locke’s theories of property and native right 
was the term vacuum domicilium (devoid of inhabitants) and its implied association with 
Locke’s theory of private property. Its mysterious origins notwithstanding, the term has had a 
hypnotic effect on modern scholars as a short hand reference to Locke’s property theory in 
Chapter 5 of the Second Treatise and Britain’s justification for its colonial policy. Vacuum 
domicilium is variously described as a presumptive ‘theory’ of imperial claims to 
sovereignty; a ‘common principle’ underlying Britain’s colonial policy and practice; ‘and 
accepted rule’ (Ellis 1885, 248); a concept of ancient or Roman law; an ‘international legal 
doctrine’ (Glover 2006, 444);  a claim to right of possession or property title; Locke’s own 
concept (Jennings 1971, 521-28; Cave 1988; White 1999; Dickason 2000; Glover 2006, 444). 
Attempts to document the origin and clarify the use of this term in the seventeenth century 
became reminiscent of another infamously elusive term, terra nullius. Indeed terra nullius 
and vacuum domicilium are sometimes used interchangeably (Tully 1995, 74; Sarson 2005, 
26). 
The origins of vacuum domicilium have been sweepingly attributed to Roman law, 
Justinian’s Digest or Corpus juris civilis, to Grotius and the Natural Law school, and even 
(bizarrely, but frequently) to Thomas More’s Utopia.2  Yet the term does not appear in any of 
these documents, either in their Latin originals or their English translations (McMillan 2003, 
427-28).  Nor can the term be found in legal dictionaries.  What modern scholars call the 
common, dominant principle of British imperial policy is to be found nowhere except in very 
narrow early seventh-century Puritan theological doctrine as ‘vacant soyle,’ invariably 
controversial and always at odds with colonial practice even by its small handful of 
exponents. Despite the complacent scholarly assertions by contemporary scholars that it was 
the controlling principle of New World settlement, vacuum domicilium can only be traced to 
                                                 
2 More’s Utopia (published in 1516) is invoked by several writers as if the book was, variously, a treatise 
extending Roman law into international law, an influential text either tracing or driving English imperial policy 
or, most bizarrely, a proposed model for British colonialism (Washburn 1959, 15; Cave 1988, 279; Schweitzer 
2003, 182; Sarson 2005, 26).  None of these references treat it for what it is, a work of satire, imagination and, 
most powerfully, a scathing critique of British and European monarchy, law and culture. Washburn (1959, 24) 
described Utopia as an expression by More of ‘the justice of expansion.’ 
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the idiosyncratic and inconsistent usages by John Winthrop, Governor of the Massachusetts 
Bay Colony, and one or two other invocations of biblical ‘justification’ for colonial 
plantation (Winthrop 1908 I, 294; II, 185-86). The term does not figure in the royal charters 
of the New World colonial companies, the contemporaneous documentation of colonial 
settlement or in the ethnographic literature associated with early colonial contact with native 
peoples; nor does it appear in centuries of legislative, treaty and judicial proceedings 
concerned with native lands and rights. 
It has been, nevertheless, a seductive idea in recent decades, lending a condemnatory 
coherence to the European settlement of the New World.  Vacuum domicilium is presented as 
an antique, culturally obtuse, racist explanation for the tragic, often violent, displacement, 
sequestration and banishment of the Indian population from their immemorial, and 
immemorially contested, tribal territories.  A measure of the hypnotic power of a supposed 
precept of Roman law is its routine appearance in secondary school and university curricula, 
and on native American websites, as an on-line ‘resource’ for school teachers (Stanford 
University 2006; Memorial Hall 2007; Native American Nations 2007).  Generations of students 
are now being taught that English colonists came to the New World fully armed to impose 
themselves on the native population, violently expel them, and feel fully justified in doing so 
on the grounds of an ancient, prestigious legal doctrine that was arrogantly blind to the rights 
and even the lives of semi-nomadic tribal peoples.  Their lands were ‘void’ of people and 
their soil was ‘vacant’; therefore the land was vacuum domicilium – simply available for 
good Christian people to arrive in their obedience to God’s injunction to  clear and fence the 
land, till the soil and bring forth bountiful harvests. 
This makes a good story, it resonates with contemporary political morality, and at least 
the tragic consequences of the devastation of English settlement for Amerindian life and 
culture are profoundly true.  The historical and theoretical difficulty is that the powerful 
guiding force of the concept of vacuum domicilium, and Locke’s central responsibility for 
conceiving and promoting the idea, is essentially pure fiction.  Worse, it is bad scholarship. 
Very slender evidence suggests that vacuum domicilium was used in the 1630s, at least 
by some colonial officials, pilgrim preachers all. The earliest documented occurrences are in 
the private journals and reminiscences of Governor John Winthrop of the Massachusetts Bay 
Colony (serving intermittently from 1630-1648).  The term is invariably linked to the rare 
occasion of Winthrop’s use (Oliver 1856, 102) or an attribution by his contemporary colonial 
intimates; it is even possible that he invented it.  His use of the term was rhetorical, 
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contradictory, and apparently invoked only when the governing council refused to certify de 
facto land sales between Indians and individual colonists.  One can speculate that Winthrop 
was using his Cambridge Latin and erstwhile legal experience to generalise from Old 
Testament doctrine enjoining the redeemed to ‘subdue’ and ‘refresh’ the earth and make it 
plentiful (Higgenson 1689, 19; Polishook 1967, 51-55; Neuwirth 1986, 44, 52).  Clearly he 
was struggling to dignify, with supposed legal terms of art, the Massachusetts Company’s 
charter to settle and govern in dangerous and always fractious circumstances.  His rationale 
sometimes invoked the supposed ancient right of possession as a justification for the royal 
charter’s grant of land. Yet on other occasions he invoked that right against presumptions of 
royal possession on the grounds that colonial property had been rightfully purchased from its 
Indian owners (Winthrop 1908 II, 185-86). 
Modern scholars, when they bother at all, source the term’s provenance to the 
nineteenth-century Boston divine and historian, George Edward Ellis, who asserted that 
vacuum domicilium was an ‘accepted rule’ upon which ‘much stress’ was laid. 
In 1633 the Court ordered “that the Indians had a just right to such lands as they possessed and 
improved by subduing the same, Gen. I 28, ix. 1.” The condition demanded was actual occupation by 
tillage.  The accepted rule was vacuum domicilium cedit occupanti.  Plymouth devoted several necks 
of land to the Indians, and pronounced them inalienable. (Ellis 1885: 248) 
 
Though Ellis doesn’t say so, the ‘accepted rule’ he postulates must be taken from Oliver 
(1856, 102), who cites a Massachusetts Bay General Court order of 1633: ‘what lands any of 
the Indians have possessed and improved, by subduing the same, they have just right unto, 
according to that in Genesis, ch. i, 28, and ch. ix, 1.’ Oliver baldly concludes: ‘Thus the 
argument used was vacuum domicilium cedit occupanti.’  I have not been able to determine 
whether that formula was actually used in 1633, or whether it is Oliver’s learned phrase.  
A second usage by Ellis (1888, 279) also relates to the recognition rather than the 
dispossession of Indian property by the early colonial governments.  It concerned ‘the 
relations between the Indian proprietors [sic] and the English colonists whom [Roger] 
Williams charged with an usurpation of their rights.’  ‘It is true,’ Ellis states 
that we find the [colonists] laying much stress upon the opportunity of entering here upon a vacuum 
domicilium, – a large territory wasted and cleared by pestilence…. Before transfer of the government 
here, the Governor of the Company, writing from London to Endicott, their agent in Salem, instructed 
him thus: “If any of the salvages pretend right of inheritance to all or any part of the lands granted in 
our patent, we pray you endeavour to purchase their tityle that we may avoyde the least scruple of 
intrusion.” [Court Records, i. 394]  The instruction was strictly followed. 
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Interestingly, Ellis’s only direct quotation vacuum domicilium from a colonial source, 
refers to the Massachusetts colony’s fraught dealings in 1633 with the dissenting Roger 
Williams. The usage is a ironic commentary on Williams’s infamous diatribe against the 
‘lies’ of the English king, the consequent illegitimacy of the colony’s royal charter, and his 
staunch claim of Indian sovereignty over land, despite himself holding a title to a house and 
ten acres of land in the  Salem settlement. 
By a touch of humor rare in the pages of [John] Winthrop, it appears that the Governor took note of 
this fact.  In his letter to Endicott he writes: “But if our title be not good, neither by patent, nor 
possession of these parts as vacuum domicilium, nor by good liking of the natives, I mervayle by what 
title Mr. Williams himselfe holds.” (Ellis 1888: 280) 
 
Winthrop (1587-1649) was a Cambridge educated, Gray’s Inn lawyer in London before 
his fervent Puritan beliefs caused him to find shelter from God’s wrath inevitably to be 
visited upon England for the popish subversion of the Anglican Church.  His use of vacuum 
domicilium was noticed by Gummere (1933, 330), who notes that the Governor employed a 
number of legal phrases in managing affairs of colony.  
A venerable colonial figure from the Massachusetts Bay Colony, the Reverend John 
Higgenson of Salem, also used vacuum domicilium in 1689 as a term of art when New 
England was on the verge of revolt against England (as Parliament was against the king) 
because of the king’s invoking a royal right to the whole of the colonies’ lands. Higgenson 
(1689: 18-19) swore an affidavit on the question ‘Whether all the lands in New-England were 
not the king’s?’ 
I did not understand that the lands of New-England were the king’s, but the king’s subjects, who had 
for more than sixty years had the possession and use of them by a twofold right warranted by the 
word of God. 1. By a right of just occupation from the grand charter in Genesis 1st and 9th chapters, 
whereby God gave the earth to the sons of Adam and Noah, to be subdued and replenished. 2. By a 
right of purchase from the Indians, who were native inhabitants, and had possession of the land 
before the English came hither, and that having lived here sixty years, I did certainly know from the 
beginning of these plantations our fathers entered upon the land, partly as a wilderness and Vacuum 
Domicilium, and partly by consent of the Indians, and therefore care was taken to treat with them, and 
to gain their consent, giving them such a valuable consideration as was to their satisfaction. 
 
Higgenson’s testimony shows his awareness of vacuum domicilium as a concept, but also 
his firm conviction that it was not an adequate expression of how the settlers had come into 
possession of their property, considering the established policy of negotiation and purchase of 
land, and the adjudication of ensuing disputes, by the colonial councils and courts.  Indeed, 
this was not only true of New England.  Jennings (1971, 200) describes a small Puritan 
settlement ‘in the midst of about 3,000 Wampanoag Indians’ on Martha’s Vineyard, New 
York in 1643:  
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On the Vineyard, Indian rights in property were fully respected. When Vineyard converts requested a 
tract of land to be set aside for a Christian village, they obtained it from the pagan sachems Josias and 
Wannamanhutt on promise of payment of an annual rent. The government of their town was 
committed to Governor Mayhew because it was Christian, but outside the town the non-Christian 
sachems kept their customary prerogatives to govern and to sanction property transfers. 
 
Locke as imperial theorist, apologist, ideologue? 
It is possible that Locke was unaware of the half-century of property dealings and judicial 
proceedings in New England.  Consequently his references to the vast wastes of the New 
World – and such literary allusions as ‘once all the world was America’ – might represent his 
literal ignorance and obsolete convictions.  It is doubtful that any hard evidence could be a 
conclusive register of his, ignorance, knowledge or, for that matter, his intentions.3  Of course 
the assumption that Locke was a callous ideological apologist for British imperial oppression 
and capitalist exploitation, ignoring or running roughshod over native peoples, is also 
speculative and suffers from evidentiary lacunae.  Nevertheless, the critiques of Locke as 
imperial apologist, enthusiastic colonialist and even racist are increasingly frequent in 
modern scholarship (Sarson 2005, 26; Arneil 1994, 1996, 1996a; Ivison 2003, 93; Peacock 
1984, 40; Tomlins 2005, 45; Armitage 2000, 98; Thompson 2002, 56-58; Tully 1995, 78-
79).4 
For example, James Tully associates theories of acquisition and possession by early 
English colonists with Locke’s ideas on property in the state of nature (Tully 1993, 150-52). 
Tully argues that their ideas ‘function’ in Locke’s work to relegate the native population on 
the basis of a lesser psychological capacity: ‘Because the Amerindian political and property 
system is tied to a world of limited desires and possessions it is unsuited to the development 
of modern states and systems of property.’ In effect, Tully argues that the early settlers’ 
essentially theological defence of English plantation on the basis of ‘vacant soyle’ or vacuum 
domicilium had a greater impact on the practical experience of property relations among the 
English settlers, courts, colonial governments and the Indians because of Locke’s thinking a 
half-century later. 
                                                 
3 Tully (1993, 151) provides a brief but undocumented acknowledgement of Locke’s appreciation of Indian 
affairs: ‘Locke was aware that the native peoples did not govern themselves in the wholly individual and 
independent manner laid out in his description of the state of nature, but were organized politically into nations.’ 
4 A bibliography of twenty-two scholarly articles ‘focused particularly on debates about the presence of racism 
in Locke's writings’ prepared for The Race Roundtable (13 November 2004) sponsored Philosophy Department, 
Oregon State University, is available at http://oregonstate.edu/~cloughs/RaceRefs.html 
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Tully does not seriously entertain Locke’s forthright doctrine of the survival of native 
rights upon usurpation and conquest.  ‘Locke’s theory of conquest,’ Tully dismissively 
asserts, ‘was written for another purpose.’5 Locke’s reference to ‘more land than the 
inhabitants can make use of…thereby [brings] his theories of conquest and appropriation into 
harmony’ (155). Such a comment is risible considering that Locke was writing a damning 
critique, not a ‘theory’ of conquest. 
In a subsequent study, Tully (1995, 78) again sees Locke through the prism of blame.  
Locke’s account  [of ‘Aboriginal government’ compared to a ‘modern constitution’] covers over the 
real history of the interaction of European imperialism and Aboriginal resistance.  The invasion of 
America, usurpation of Aboriginal nations, theft of the continent, imposition of European economic 
and political systems, and the steadfast resistance of the Aboriginal peoples are replaced with the 
captivating picture of the inevitable and benign progress of modern constitutionalism. 
 
Tully reflects the entrenched anachronism of attributing Locke’s overweening influence 
on colonial ventures by offering ‘evidence’ that indiscriminately conflates Locke’s Second 
Treatise with ideas published a half-century earlier that were articulated in terms of biblical 
scripture and supposed concepts of Roman law that Locke himself never mentioned. Tully 
writes, ‘Hence, land used for hunting and gathering is considered vacant and, as John Cotton 
concluded fifty years earlier  
‘in a vacant soil [terra nullius] [sic], he that taketh possession of it, and bestoweth culture and 
husbandry upon it, his right it is’. Consequently, hunters and gathers possess no rights in lands they 
have used and occupied for centuries and so have ‘no reason to complain or think themselves injured’ 
by European ‘incroachment.’ (Tully 1995, 74) 
 
It is apposite to note Cotton never used the phrase terra nullius, as Tully implies. Tully’s 
supporting footnote cites Locke’s Second Treatise, ¶¶ 42, 45 and 32, as if he had somehow 
influenced John Cotton’s published sermon (Cotton 1634), a theological diatribe against a 
never published essay that asserted a robust defence of Indian rights of property and 
territoriality by Roger Williams (1963 II, 47).  
                                                 
5 Tully (1995, 150) implies that Locke’s discussion of conquest and usurpation is merely a commentary on 
relations (claims, counterclaims and war) between sovereign states, and was therefore unrelated to the narrower 
diplomatic concepts of discovery and possession advanced by European powers. Paradoxically, Locke’same 
passages are condemned for justifying European invasion and dispossession of indigenous peoples in the guise 
of exploration, discovery, possession and Christian evangelism. 
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Even a scholar as eminent as Richard Tuck (1999, 177-78), is anachronistic in discussing 
William Penn’s acknowledgment of Indian native rights circa 1681, ignoring identical 
arguments by William Rogers in New Providence a half-century earlier.6 
Penn’s whole approach was diametrically opposite to that of Locke [who would not publish the 
Second Treatise for a decade, and then anonymously], and the founding of Pennsylvania represented 
a major challenge to the principles upon which the English colonies had so far been planted in 
America.  Locke seems to have been suspicious not only of Penn’s generosity to the Indians, but also 
of the absolutist tendencies displayed by Penn. 
 
Tuck implies as exceptional what had been the general policy and judicial practice of the 
earlier New Providence and Massachusetts Bay land purchases. 
Condemnations of Locke often take the form of a ritual that requires, and receives, no 
argument.  Maurice Cranston (1975, 119) summarily judged that ‘Locke was easily infected 
with Ashley’s [3rd Early of Shaftsbury] zeal for commercial imperialism.’ Barbara Arneil 
(1992, 603) assumes complicity: 
Locke’s Two Treatises was an attempt to undermine the Indian’s claims to land by creating a new 
definition of property. Aware that Indians in  the New World could claim property through the right 
of occupancy, Locke developed a theory of agrarian labour which would, through the right of  
agricultural labour, specifically exclude the American Indian from claiming  land. 
 
If Locke is hardly done by political theorists, the treatment is mild compared to the 
sweeping condemnations of colonial historians, ethno-historians and literary critics. For 
Ivison (1997, 166) Locke even bears responsibility for Australia’s High Court finding in 
1979 against Aboriginal territorial sovereignty: 
the possession of sovereignty [hinges] on the existence of a particular form of civil and political 
society [that] neatly excludes any consideration of Aboriginal institutions and norms, and thus any 
reasonable consideration of their claims.  Indeed it was invoked by Locke, amongst others, to justify 
the expansion of British colonization in the Americas.7 
 
Ivison’s (2002: 45) critique returns in postmodern dress when Locke 
is said to have thickened out the anthropological minimalism grounding man’s natural freedom from 
socio-cultural conceptions of rational competency and ‘reasonableness’ that ruled out taking the 
claims of indigenous peoples seriously.  His concept of property…conveniently de-legitimated Native 
American sovereignty and landholding practices. 
 
                                                 
6 However Tuck (1999, 47-50) gives a fine scholarly account of the ancient origins and humanist revival of the 
legal and moral dimensions of the occupation of ‘vacant land,’ though nowhere does he use the term vacuum 
domicilium. Footnote 94 allows that Locke ‘presumably’ derived his idea of cultivation as a means of acquiring 
propriety of land from the canonist Franciscus [Accolti] Arieto’s Consilia of 1536. 
7 Reflecting the cross-pollination of these arguments, Ivison supports this claim with references to Tully (1993 
and 1995) rather than Locke. 
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In a slipshod and tendentious argument, Peacock (1984, 40) footnotes Locke with a 
reference to ‘pp. 3-143’ and Governor Winthrop with a lengthy passage in fact written by 
Francis Jennings (1975).  Peacock implies that the Second Treatise ‘proposed’ concepts 
influencing the Puritan colonists sixty years before it was written: 
In 1690 John Locke would propose on behalf of English Puritans that “the true original, extent and 
end of civil  government” was to establish institutions for holding, transferring, protecting, and 
adjudicating disputes about private property and national territory.8 
 
Anthony Pagden (1993, 117), not alone (Seleger 1969, 23), is taken in by Locke’s 
poetry, declaring that “America was still, in John Locke’s celebrated phrase, ‘in the 
beginning’ of the whole world, and its inhabitants, unlike the Asians of the Africans, had 
seemed at first sight to live in the ‘Golden Age of their customs’.” [Italics added.] The 
colourful image, however, is referenced to a work by Peter Martyr of 1530. 
Thompson (2002, 65), refers mysteriously to ‘a Lockean deed of title’ and follows the 
conventional view of imputing dire consequences to Locke’s early argument about 
appropriating property while entirely ignoring Locke’s recognition of native right to property 
and possessions. 
Locke’s theory, so often used by settlers and governments [sic] as a justification for expropriating the 
land of indigenous people, seems an unpromising basis for an attempt to ground the land rights of an 
indigenous community. (56) 
 
Even Washburn (1959, 22-23), in a bracingly clear-sighted critique of attempts to justify 
Indian displacement, cannot resist an easy shot: ‘John Locke was perhaps its most famous 
exponent, although, characteristically, he did not develop the argument logically or clearly.’ 8 
Later, Washburn (1976, 14) inadvertently undermines Locke’s ‘influence’ on a policy of 
dispossessing ‘wandering hunters’ and the practical effectiveness of such a justification.  
Thus in the early decades of the seventeenth century: 
Many of the Puritan divines and colonial governors sought to justify their claims to Indian lands by 
arguing that European farmers had a right to settle in areas that were incompletely possessed by 
nomadic hunters or insufficiently utilized by native agriculturalists. In such Puritan writings as John 
Cotton’s God’s Promise to his Plantation, this claim was grounded in divine sanction…. Despite 
such theologically tinged arguments most of the colonists’ dealings with the American Indian were 
effected through a variety of practical agreements. 
 
                                                 
8 John Dunn (1969, 72-72) notes the scholarly association of Locke with ‘the expropriation of the Indians by the 
laborious and God-fearing people of New England,’ but exonerates Locke from any direct influence on 
eighteenth-century ideas of property, in England or America, except rightly attributing to Locke the idea of the 
‘moral dignity’ of labour as contrasted with the older natural law idea (both Roman and Grotian) of property by 
mere possession. 
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Washburn concedes that in John Cotton’s own colonial milieu, a half-century before 
Locke’s Second Treatise, the doctrine of ‘vacant soyle’ was a rhetorical expression of 
theological doctrine of doubtful practical relevance.  Indeed, the idea was both absurd and 
dangerous to colonial experience, since the Indians were manifestly present in great numbers 
and enjoyed a far more stable livelihood than the newly ‘planted’ English settlers.  The 
‘strange proximity’ (White 1991; Thomas 1999) of the people whose lands they had entered 
created a ‘balance of power’ that was as easy for the settlers to feel as it has been convenient 
for modern scholars to underestimate  or simply ignore. It is ironic that the biblical injunction 
of ‘vacant soyle’ and the supposed Roman law precept of vacuum domicilium have been 
more assiduously employed in contemporary historical interpretation and Lockean 
scholarship than they were in the actual experience of Indians and colonial settlers. 
Nevertheless some historians, especially legal scholars, have documented the complex 
colonial property relations (Allen 1981; Anderson 1994; Glover 2006; Muldoon 2001; Konig 
1974, 138-39, 176; Leavenworth 1999, 276-82; Osgood 1904, 225-26; Slattery 1991; 
Springer 1986; Thomas 1999; Wallace 1957, 315-19; Washburn 1959, 1976; Webber 1995).   
Their work serves as an important corrective to historians’ (and Hollywood’s) dominant 
focus on frontier violence, warfare and tragic dislocations.  This is reflected in a revealing 
introduction to a collection of essays (Smolenski and Humphrey 2005, 6) whose editor seems 
to distance himself from his own colleagues: 
It is in some ways difficult to see how one can reconcile John Locke’s intellectual justifications for 
dispossessing Indians of their land – so central in David Armitage and Anthony Pagden’s discussions 
of the English conception of empire – with the actual course of colonial settlement on the eastern 
coast of North America in which colonizers and Indians frequently lived side by side.  Despite 
frequent outbreaks of violence, in practice the tenor of Anglo-Native relations was dictated more by 
extralegal customs governing social and economic exchange than by the formal justifications for 
English power. 
 
Smolenski (2005, 283) discreetly credits two scholars not included in the book, David 
Silverman and Nancy Shoemaker, for suggesting ‘that historians have exaggerated the 
differences between Indian and European notions of property, causing them to misunderstand 
conflict over this issue.’ 
A major reassessment of these matters was begun by James Warren Springer (1986, 25-
26), who documents the myriad property relations between Indians and early English 
colonists.  His analysis of the legal documentation – royal company charters, colonial 
governments, property deeds and court records – led him to distinguish between  
general policy statements by colonial leaders, on theological and moral justifications for the English 
settlement of New England and occupation of Indian lands, or on philosophical speculations as to the 
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nature of primitive society.  Such writings can easily mislead one as to the policies actually adopted 
by colonial governments, whereas the court records at least show the direct manifestation of the 
policies in specific cases. 
 
Springer (1986, 55-56) observes of many colonial historians: 
many works…have claimed that the Puritans either recognized no Indian rights to the land, or else 
recognized only rights to those small plots being used for fields or villages…. There is, indeed, some 
support for this view in the more extreme philosophical and theological statements from prominent 
Puritans, such as John Winthrop.… The Puritans self-justifications have provided ammunition for 
many polemics, among them Jennings’s The Invasion of America [1975, 135-38].  
 
Springer’s meticulous examination of colonial records reaches a strikingly different 
assessment than studies relying on Puritan rhetoric of biblical injunctions (Genesis 1 and 8) 
and the mysterious pseudo-legalism, vacuum domicilium. 
The court decisions…give a very different picture. They not only show that Indian rights to 
unimproved lands were generally recognized, but they evidence a concern for balancing the interests 
and the equities that is not present in the philosophical and political literature. In so doing, they 
provide a second and sounder basis for criticizing the view that the English recognized virtually no 
Indian rights in land. (Springer 1986, 58) 
 
Springer (1986, 56) counters the Jennings indictment by quoting contemporaneous 
Puritan authorities. For example, the Governor of New Haven in 1647, rejecting the Dutch 
claim of title to Connecticut land in a letter to the Governor of Amsterdam: ‘we first came 
into these partes, & vppon due purchase from the Indians, who were the true proprietours of 
the land (for we fownd it not a vacuum).’  Similarly in 1662, the General Court of 
Massachusetts Bay upheld what they called ‘native title’:  
such haue binn the incouragement of the Indians in their improovements thereof, the which, added to 
their native right, which cannot, in strict justice, be vtterly extinct, doe therefore order, that the 
Indians be not dispossessed of such lands as they at present are possessed of there.’ (Springer 1986, 
56) 
 
Conclusion: Locke’s rhetorical strategy to reconcile the irreconcilable 
The Second Treatise needs to be seen in the political context of Locke’s critique of 
monarchical absolutism and arbitrary power (the central theme of the First Treatise).  The 
fundamental check on arbitrary power arises from Locke’s theory of the original, natural 
right to property.  Locke repeats again and again in the Treatise that ‘the great and chief end 
of men’s putting themselves under government’ is the preservation of property in the larger 
sense of ‘the mutual preservation of their lives, liberties and estates.’ (¶123)  
Just as the Second Treatise argues that private disputes are dangerous to lawful peace in 
the state of nature, so it follows that sovereign disputes (war and conquest) violate peace and 
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good order.  Thus a colonial entry into the vast wastes of America must be carried out by 
lawful enterprises of constituted authority whose acquisition of property must be undertaken 
only by those who, on the one hand, are competent to grant it and, on the other, those able to 
secure its enjoyment. Locke’s insistence that property is and always remains a natural right 
(that governments are formed to secure, not seize) is consistent with his argument that the 
native right to lands and other goods cannot be extinguished or alienated by an act of 
arbitrary power or the passage of time. 
Thus Locke’s supposed confusion, paradox, or downright defence of imperialist 
expropriation of native title charged by his critics can be seen in another light.  Sovereign acts 
– whether of just or unjust conquest, usurpation, or outright tyranny – discussed in the later 
chapters of the Second Treatise do not and can never extinguish native rights of property and 
possession, such as they have been naturally and rightfully appropriated as set forth in the 
earlier chapters. Locke surely did recognise that the Indians’ enjoyment of their property was 
meagre and did not engender the ease and bounty of a civil, laborious life.  But Locke equally 
recognised that what was theirs was theirs.  When the English treated with  the Indians it was 
right and proper to do as the colonists did, which was to treat and deal with them – whether 
or not as separate nations – on the basis of natural right and Christian duty.  Thus when 
Locke (1669) drafted the Constitution of Carolina Company, the Indians were repeatedly 
referred to as ‘neighbours’ to be treated accordingly.  All dealings relating to land, commerce 
and other property were to be carried out, whether individually or tribally, by the lawful 
colonial authorities.  Given that the Indians were considerably superior in numbers to the 
colony, enjoyed more assured provisions and moved more securely and familiarly in the land, 
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